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The World Health Organization (WHO) is mandated to be the United Nations 
specialized agency for health. However, in light of changing disease trends, the 
increased “globalization” of health, and the entry of other actors into the health 
arena, much of the current discourse in global health research discusses the 
future of the WHO and its current role  in governing global health, and how this 
should, or can change. This paper examines the role of the WHO in global health 
diplomacy and the promotion of global health security by examining the 
Indonesian virus-sharing case. In 2007, the Indonesian government pulled out 
of the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), concerned that its strains 
of H5N1 would be used to make vaccines in the high-income countries which 
would then be “resold” to Indonesia at what they considered to be unaffordable 
prices. They were also concerned that scientists in high-income countries would 
be able to take out patents based on these strains, which they asserted was their 
sovereign property. This paper discusses to what extent the International 
Health Regulations (IHR) and other agreements are applicable to this case and 
why countries have chosen to address this issue through an intergovernmental 
process rather than invoking the IHR. It also questions the enforceability of 
international agreements and their role in promoting equity.  This paper then 
examines why current negotiations over virus-sharing have not reached an 
agreement. In doing so we can use this case to ask broader question about what 
“effective” global health diplomacy is, how global health governance 
architecture could, and should change – and what should the WHO’s role in 






Article 2a of the World Health Organization’s constitution states that the WHO is 
to act as the directing and coordinating authority on international health work. 
Although it is mandated to be the United Nations (UN) specialized agency for 
health, in recent years the WHO has faced criticisms of being overly politicized 
and a bureaucratic and static institution. Moreover, in light of changing disease 
trends, the increased “globalization” of health and the entry of other actors into 
the health arena – such as global disease partnerships and other international 
institutions, including the World Bank and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) – much of the current discourse in global health research discusses the 
future of the WHO and its role currently in governing global health, and how this 
should or can change, as well as the management and governance of the WHO 
itself and this debate affects its global role.1 Within this framework we must also 
ask how the WHO can promote global health security through global health 
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diplomacy - the process of making compromises and agreements in multi-actor 
and multi-level negotiations which is at the heart of global health governance.2
Global health security is a problematic term, used differently by different 
people in varying contexts. It comes out of the 1994 United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) Development Report, which framed human security as freedom 
from fear and want, and safety from threats such as hunger, disease, repression 
and sudden disruptions in daily life. 3  Within this, the report listed seven 
components of human security: economic, food, environmental, personal, 
community, political and health. The term can also be used to differentiate 
between individual (personal) health security and collective (public) health 
security. 4  That is, individual health security includes equitable access to 
medicines, vaccines and prevention and access to health systems, whereas 
collective health security addresses public health risks that threaten entire 
group/populations and events such as pandemics, chemical spills, and nuclear 
accidents. Complaints over the term have risen because of the military 
connotations of the word “security,” and also over the United States’ use of 
framing AIDS as a “security issue” in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which 
sought to examine how AIDS was causing failed states, rather than 
understanding the complex relationship between poverty, general political 
economic conditions and AIDS. Moreover, in using this term, we ask “whose 
security for whom?” That is, by framing health concerns as “security issues” in 
the international relations sense, countries risk becoming protectionist, rather 
than focusing on achieving global health security for the world. 
This paper utilizes the case study of Indonesia and virus-sharing to 
highlight some of the questions - and possible solutions – within these global 
governance, diplomacy, and health security debates. In 2007, Indonesia pulled 
out of the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), concerned that its 
strains of H5N1 (avian influenza) would be used to make vaccines in high-income 
countries which would then be “resold” to Indonesia at what they considered to 
be unaffordable prices. The Indonesian government was also concerned that 
scientists in high-income countries would be able to take out patents based in 
part on these strains. The sharing of virus samples is necessary because it allows 
researchers to track the evolution and spread of resistance, to evaluate the risk of 
a pandemic and allows for the development of vaccines.5 As Indonesia had more 
confirmed H5N1 human cases and deaths of any other country, its withdrawal 
from the network was particularly concerning, and posed a threat to global health 
security.6  
This paper outlines the Indonesian case and reviews international 
agreements, especially the IHR, and the use of World Health Assembly (WHA) 
resolutions and the Convention on Biological Diversity, with which the case is 
concerned. It then examines the limitations and ambiguities of these agreements 
and discusses why countries have chosen to work through the issue via an 
intergovernmental process rather than by invoking international law. This paper 
concludes that, although “hard” laws are very useful in many instances, in their 
current state they do not address the concerns of Indonesia, nor are necessarily 
the most effective method of addressing these issues or Indonesia’s reluctance to 
share virus samples. Further, this paper argues that instead we should examine 
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why current negotiations over virus-sharing have not been resolved, and 
concentrate on examining global health diplomacy and how this can be more 
effective. Although this case demonstrates a gap in the current global health 
governance architecture, it also presents an opportunity for reform and asking 
questions such as how the WHO can re-define itself as a forum for global health 
diplomacy and what other actors can and should be involved and in what roles, 
which is addressed in the conclusion. 
 
THE INDONESIAN CASE  
 
The Global Influenza Surveillance Network is not a binding network or 
international regulation, but is a structure within global influenza governance.7 It 
has operated for nearly 60 years, and functions by participating countries 
sending samples to one of four collaborating centers (UK, US, Japan, Australia) 
where those samples are analyzed. The WHO then decides which strains pose the 





Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A was first identified amongst poultry 
in Indonesia in December 2003. In 2005, Indonesia reported the first human 
H5N1 case and by the end of 2007, it had the largest number of cases (116) and a 
case fatality rate of over 80 percent.9 Although the outbreak was concentrated in 





In January 2007, Indonesia ceased to share virus samples with the GISN, 
after having learnt that an Australian pharmaceutical company had developed a 
vaccine based on an Indonesian strain without their knowledge or consent.10 
Indonesia argued that the current methods of vaccine production and 
distribution were neither equitable nor transparent. That is, current global 
capacity for vaccine production does not meet demand and most of those 
vaccinated were from high-income countries,11 although the greater burden of 
disease is in lower-income countries. That Indonesian samples would be used by 
pharmaceutical companies to create vaccines that were unlikely to be available to 
Indonesia was deemed “unfair” by Indonesian Minister of Health Siti Fadilah 
Supari,12 and she questioned the incentives that countries like Indonesia have to 
continue sharing their samples. Specifically, countries that are hardest hit by a 
disease must also bear the brunt of the cost for vaccines and treatment, while the 
benefits of these products are enjoyed by pharmaceutical companies, mainly in 
higher income countries. In this sense, poor countries have no bargaining 
position.13
Another concern of the Indonesian government was transparency within 
the virus-sharing system. For example, there were no reference documents 
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explaining exactly the roles and function of not only the four WHO collaborating 
centers, but also other laboratories involved in the vaccine development.14 The 
situation was further exacerbated by the WHO’s acknowledgement that patents 
had been sought on modified versions of H5N1 samples shared via the GISN 
within the consent of their countries of origin.15 The Indonesians also invoked the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), which mandates that countries share 
in the benefits if their genetic resources are utilized by others.16  
In March 2007, following back-to-back meetings between the WHO and 
Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia announced it would resume the sharing of virus 
samples. This was achieved in part by promises by the WHO to help increase 
global vaccine production capabilities and suggestions by WHO representatives 
to explore short-term responses such as national stockpiling of vaccine and 
influenza drugs, and guarantees that if industry were to set aside a percentage of 
the vaccine, the WHO would purchase these.17 The WHO also agreed to revise the 
current Terms of Reference for WHO laboratories, which would outline agreed 
uses of the virus samples, including their provision to pharmaceutical 
companies.18 Long-term suggestions included the bulk transfer of vaccines and 
technology from current manufactures to pharmaceutical industries in low and 
middle-income countries.19 Indeed in April 2007 the WHO convened a meeting 
to assess the feasibility of vaccine stockpiling and increasing pharmaceutical 
production. Also in April 2007 the WHO awarded a total of $18 million to Brazil, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam to develop their own vaccine 
manufacturing capability. 20  This meeting was also followed by a High Level 
Meeting of 33 countries and sponsored by the Indonesians at which the Jakarta 
Declaration set out the need for transparent, fair and equitable virus-sharing. 
After the March 2007 meeting the GISN did receive three samples.21 In 
May 2007, a news piece in Lancet Infectious Disease featured the header, 
“Dispute resolved over sharing avian influenza virus samples.”22 However, the 
dispute was far from over. Throughout the remainder of 2007, Indonesia 
remained reluctant to share virus samples 23  and in the past year (2009) 
Indonesia has not shared any samples with the GISN, including those from H1N1 
(swine flu). Even with regard to releasing notifications of avian influenza, they 
have tended to only let out information in batches at certain times of the year.  
Indonesia furthered their cause at the World Health Assembly in May 2007 of 
that same year. Resolution WHA60.28, agreement upon which was only reached 
through intense negotiations, called for action to promote the “transparent, fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the generation of information, 
diagnostics, medicines, vaccines and other technologies” whilst simultaneously 
maintaining the “timely sharing of viruses and specimens.” Out of this Resolution 
an interdisciplinary group was also created to address issues in the global virus-
sharing network, such as transparency and clear terms of references with WHO 
laboratories. The Resolution also requested the Director-General to address the 
issues of vaccine access and increasing manufacturing production in low and 
middle-income countries. However, Indonesia did not feel that this Resolution 
adequately addressed the issues of access to vaccines and the sharing of other 
benefits or the issue of transparency in the virus-sharing system and thus 
remained hesitant to share sample.24  
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In July-August 2007 the interdisciplinary working group (IDWG) met in 
Singapore but did not resolve the issue, failing to reach consensus on a Standard 
Terms and Conditions for virus-sharing, as well as on the reforms of the Terms of 
Reference for the WHO laboratories.25 Following the failed IDWG meeting, in 
November 2007 the International Governmental Meeting (IGM) on “Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and access to Vaccines and 
Other Benefits” met in Geneva. The statement that came out the meeting was not 
agreed upon by all participating member states, but it provisionally 
acknowledged the breakdown of trust in the system. It also noted the need for 
fair, transparent, equitable, and effective international mechanisms to ensure 
access to H5N1 vaccines, and the WHO was tasked to establish a tracking system 
for virus samples and an oversight mechanism in the form of an independent 
advisory group for monitoring and further developing the system.  
It was in this meeting that Indonesia pushed for the use of a Standard 
Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) for each sample sent out-of-country, and 
insisted that they would not send samples overseas without an SMTA. In this, 
they would specify that the sample be used only for diagnostic purposes and any 
commercial use of the sample (i.e. vaccine production) would require the 




In Spring of 2008, Indonesia also banned NAMRU, a U.S. Navy Medical 
unit in Jakarta that had analyzed biological samples. The unit had been in 
operation for decades but its memorandum of understanding had expired in 
2006 and efforts to renew it were unsuccessful, due to disagreements over 
SMTAs. Indeed the US was, and continues to be, one of the countries in 
opposition to SMTAs, claiming that the terms of agreements in terms of benefits-
sharing desired by Indonesia and other states would decrease incentives for 
pharmaceuticals to create new technologies in vaccine production.26  
The open-ended working group met in April 2008 in Geneva, where 
member states discussed the WHO’s beta version of a virus-tracking system as 
well virus-stockpiling. It was decided that these issues, as well as benefit sharing, 
would be further discussed at the next IGM in November. 
By May 2008, Indonesia was still refusing to share virus-samples, but 
announced it would share genetic sequences of its virus through the newly-
launched Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID). On 
GISAID’s internet based platform, scientists can upload their influenza sequences 
as well as epidemiological and clinical data to what is known as its EpiFlu™ 
database. The initiative also encourages collaboration among countries as well as 
scientists. The platform is designed and maintained by scientists, for scientists 
from various disciplines of the influenza research, including veterinary and 
human virology, bioinformatics, epidemiology, immunology, and clinical 
analysis, etc. Although GISAID’s data is publicly accessible, it does not fall under 
the definition of Public Domain, as GISAID does not remove nor waive any 
preexisting rights where such rights exist. That is, scientists who sign up agree to 
consult with whoever uploaded the original sample before any publications or 
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intellectual property-rights agreements are made using the sample. This system 
introduces the transparency that was lacking in the GISN.27
Although Supari supported the GISAID, the overall issue of virus-sharing 
was still unresolved. Additionally, one drawback of GISAID is that it is a sharing 
of influenza data only, not actual samples and there are limitations to predicting 
viral evolution based only on sequence data. At the 61st World Health Assembly 
later in May 2008, virus-sharing was again on the agenda and member states 
expressed the need for a quick resolution and hope that the issues would be fully 
resolved at the next IGM. 
At the same time, virus-sharing via the GISAID system was also 
hampered. Within four months of its launch, GISAID had become the world’s 
largest and most comprehensive database (AP 2008). However, the WHO was 
reportedly withholding funds earmarked to support GISAID, and was in the 
process of developing their own database and tracking system. The dispute was 
over $450,000 from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
According to the US Department of Health and Human Services and GISAID, this 
money was earmarked for GISAID. According to the WHO, the money had been 
earmarked for a database, but because of the amount involved the WHO was 
required to put out an open tender. According to the WHO’s David Heymann “for 
the first time in decades, developing countries are looking at the [WHO] with 
mistrust and officials cannot afford to be partial to any group,” and that this was 
a direct order from the Director-General Margaret Chan. Yet, many flu scientists 
and governmental officials felt that this situation actually did nothing more than 
to add to mistrust of the WHO.28
In November and December 2008, the 3rd IGM and the open-ended 
working group met to establish a framework for the sharing of both virus-
samples and benefits. Although successful in agreeing upon some wording in the 




 Prior to the 62nd World Health Assembly in May, the 4th IGM convened. 
This meeting ended with a consensus on most of the above mentioned issues, and 
the IGM submitted a draft framework “Pandemic influenza preparedness 
framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other 
benefits” to the WHA for consideration. However the issues of data-sharing 
between laboratories, intellectual property rights on viruses and remained 
unresolved. 29  Specifically with regard to the SMTA, two questions remained 
unresolved:  
(1) If the recipient shares with someone who is not a signatory to the 
agreement, is the agreement binding with this third party?  
(2) If they use the materials for purposes it was not intended for, is there 
any legal recourse?30  
 
 From this draft framework, the WHA adopted WHA62.10 on Pandemic 
influenza preparedness: sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and 
other benefits. This called upon the Director-General to facilitate a transparent 
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process to finalize the Framework, including the Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement. From this, the Director-General held a 2-day consultation with 
member states later in 2009. However, disagreement remains regarding the 




In the run-up to the 2010 World Health Assembly, Indonesia maintains its 
calls for increased equity and transparency in the virus-sharing scheme. There is 
also a 3-day open-ended member state meeting scheduled before the 63rd WHA 
in May 2010 to discuss the outstanding issues and virus-sharing is the first item 
on the agenda for Committee A, followed by the IHR and intellectual property 
issues. Although progress has certainly been made in that the draft framework 
has been largely agreed upon, the situation continues as a stalemate with the 
aforementioned outstanding issues and many countries are currently negotiating 
bilateral agreements with regard to material transfer agreements. Indonesia has 
also taken steps to establish a WHO influenza collaborating center in which they 




Sovereignty is the underlying principle of international law, and this concept 
maintains that a state has authority and control over the people, resources, and 
functions within its borders. Within international law, states are prohibited from 
intervening in each other’s domestic affairs, but limits on sovereignty arise when 
states agree to be bound by international law.32 It has been suggested that the 
International Health Regulations, in combination with several World Health 
Assembly resolutions, could have been used to force Indonesia to share its virus 
samples, and their use was discussed by the WHO Secretariat and by member 
states. Additionally, Indonesia claimed that its virus samples were its sovereign 
property, invoking the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Here, this 
paper will briefly review the IHR, World Health Assembly Resolutions, and the 
CBD. Although this paper argues that a focus on international law is far too 
narrow when discussing the overall issues, it is necessary to understand their 
limitations and why they were not explicitly invoked in order to then examine the 
gaps in global health governance and possible solutions, which will be discussed 
further in subsequent sections. 
 
The International Health Regulations  
 
The International Health Regulations (IHR) is an international legal 
instrument, binding on its 194 signatory countries, including all WHO Member 
States. The aim of the IHR is to facilitate global communication and cooperation 
for early detection and containment of public health emergencies of international 
concern (PHEIC).33 The IHR oblige signatories to notify the WHO when these 
PHEIC occur. The International Health Regulations have their origins in the 19th 
Century International Sanitary Regulations, which were revised into the 
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International Health Regulations in 1969. The IHR 1969 included provisions for 
six diseases, which were later reduced to three (cholera, yellow fever and plague) 
to reflect changing disease patterns and the eradication of smallpox. Against the 
backdrop of globalization (specifically increased trade and travel), it was 
recognized that the IHR needed to be updated.  A revision process began in the 
1990s and was pushed forward by the SARS outbreak in 2003,34 as China’s 
subterfuge in reporting SARS demonstrated a need to take into consideration 
unofficial reports of public health. These revisions culminated in the revised IHR, 
which went into force in 2007. Certainly, the 1969 IHR were lauded as the first 
health-related binding treaty, but specific limitations were addressed in the 
revisions, such that currently:  
• The scope is not limited to any specific disease, but covers “public health 
emergencies of international concern.” 
• Includes obligations of the signatory states to develop minimum public 
health capacities. 
• The WHO may take into consideration unofficial reports of public health 
events; they are no longer required to rely fully on “official” sources; 
however, these unofficial sources are to be verified by official accounts. 
• That said, they require the establishment of National and WHO IHR 
Contact Points to facilitate urgent communication. 
• The procedures for the Director General of the WHO to determine a 
PHEIC are clarified. 
• The human rights of persons and travelers are protected. 
• The revisions also update technical and regulatory functions, such as 
requirements for international ports.35  
 
It is important to note that the GISN was not organized under treaty law, 
and the most relevant international law to virus-sharing would be the IHR. The 
1969 IHR did not at all include influenza, nor did it require the sharing of 
biological samples.36 Although H5N1, as a PHEIC, is covered in the revised IHR, 
the sharing of biological samples is not explicitly required. However, under 
international law, a state must refrain from acting against a treaty’s object and 
purpose. Article 2 of the revised IHR states: 
 
The purpose and scope of these Regulations are to prevent, protect 
against, control and provide a public health response to the 
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with 
and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade. 
 
One could interpret this to mean that the withholding of virus-samples is 
against the aims of the IHR, and thus in violation of the treaty.37 At a technical 
briefing at the World Health Assembly in 2007, Director-General Margaret Chan 
stated that “countries that did not share avian influenza virus would fail the 
IHR.”38 Under a risk assessment framework, one can also argue that the IHR 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME III, NO. 2 (SPRING 2010) http://www.ghgj.org
 
IRWIN, INDONESIA, H5N1, AND GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY                                                                     9 
 
 
require virus-sharing, as risk assessment cannot be conducted without the 
sharing of biological samples. 
 
World Health Assembly Resolutions 
 
The WHO is both an entity and a forum of, and for member states. That is, 
the supreme decision body of the WHO is the World Health Assembly. The WHA 
meets annually in May to determine the program of work and to approve the 
budget. Each member state sends a delegation of no more than three delegates 
who are most technically qualified in health, preferably representing the national 
health administration. Although technically the principle of “one state, one vote” 
governs the WHA, the majority of decisions are the WHA are reached by 
consensus in advance of the WHA. These decisions often come in the form of 
resolutions. Most of actions resulting from resolutions are then carried out by the 
WHO Secretariat, the WHO’s administrative and technical organ. 39  In other 
words, WHA resolutions are soft laws. They are usually binding on the 
Secretariat, and prescribe the work it must carry out, but typically “urge” member 
states to do something, and are not binding on the member states. 
In 2006 the WHA adopted Resolution WHA59.2, which called upon 
member states to comply immediately, on a voluntary basis, with the provision of 
the revised IHR considered relevant to the risk posed by avian influenza. The 
point, which will be discussed below, is that although adopted in 2005, the 
revised IHR were not scheduled to go into effect until 2007. The resolution urged 
member states to “disseminate to the WHO collaborating centers information 
and relevant biological materials related to highly pathogenic avian influenza and 
other novel influenza strains in a timely and consistent manner.” 
 This resolution, when used in conjunction with the IHR, supports the 
interpretation that sharing biological samples is part of a country’s requirement 
to provide accurate and detailed public health information under the IHR. 
However, WHA Resolutions are non-binding on member states, and can only 
“urge” them to act. 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
In making its case, Indonesia invoked the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) began work 
on the CBD in the late 1980s, recognizing the importance of maintaining 
biological diversity, as well as the threats faced by various species and ecosystems 
as a result of human activities. The Convention also addressed concerns that 
resources in lower and middle income countries were being exploited by richer 
countries. The treaty was finalized in 1992 and went into force in 1993, with the 
objective of: 
 
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by 
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer 
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of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those 
resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.40  
 
The Convention gives countries sovereign control over the biological 
resources found within their borders and according to Indonesia, this includes 
virus-samples.41 According to Article 2 of the treaty, biological resources include 
“genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations or any other biotic 
component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity,” and 
Article 15 states “the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with 
the national governments,” and that access to genetic resources shall be subject 
to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources and 
that access “shall be on mutually agreed terms.”42  
Using this treaty, Indonesia claimed that virus-samples collected in its 
territory were its property and that under the treaty’s provisions, consent should 
be obtained before other parties use its samples, and that Indonesia should also 
share in the benefits produced by those samples, such as vaccines. Moreover, this 
claim is reflected in the WHA60.28, whose preamble recognizes the “sovereign 
right of States over their biological resources.”43 However, as with the use of the 
IHR, there are ambiguities in the applicability of the CBD to virus-sharing, which 
will be discussed below. 
 
ISSUES IN APPLYING IHR AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO THIS CASE  
 
In the case of Indonesia, issues both specific to this case and those that are more 
general concerns within of global health governance and diplomacy and 
international law can be seen. The standard critique of international law, 
particularly health law, is that is it unenforceable. Another issue is that of 
ambiguities. Although some law is very specific, in many cases international law 
can be ambiguous and member states have an interest in keeping it ambiguous so 
that they have room for manoeuvre.44
Specifically to this case, IHR is ambiguous in the matter of virus sample-
sharing. The agreement does not expressly require the sharing of biological 
samples, but a good faith interpretation of the agreement, backed by WHA59.2 
does. Also, WHA60.28, the resolution negotiated at the 2007 WHA, called not 
only for transparency and equity in virus-sharing, but also the “timely sharing of 
viruses and specimens.”45   
 However, the scope of “public health information” is ill defined in the IHR 
and a secondary interpretation is that it includes surveillance data and other 
facts, but not biological samples.46 Moreover, Article 6.2, on notification, states 
that member states should communicate to the WHO “sufficiently detailed public 
health information…including case definitions, laboratory results, source and 
type of the risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of 
the disease and the health measures employed.” Yet, it does not list “biological 
samples.”47  
Another contentious point is that the timing of the IHR going into force 
coincided with Indonesia’s case, such that it was unclear whether or not their use 
was valid. Although negotiated in 2005, the treaty had no binding force until it 
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officially entered into force in June 2007. Under international law, states are 
meant to uphold the aims and objectives of a treaty once they have expressed 
their consent to be bound by it, pending its entry into force. Additionally, 
member states had until December 2006 to bring reservations to the treaty; 
Indonesia submitted none.48  
Even if the validity of the IHR in this situation was unquestioned, the 
question of enforceability is again raised. As is, the WHO remains unable to act 
without the consent of its member states. Although member states chose to take 
the issue out of the IHR framework and into inter-governmental negotiations in 
part due to the questionable applicability of the IHR to this situation, there were 
other reasons as well which will be discussed below. In this sense, the IHR can 
only be enforced by the will of the member states. Additionally, the IHR only 
contains a weak dispute resolution mechanism, a point to which this paper will 
return in the sections below. Moreover, if the IHR were to be invoked, it is 
unclear what this would look like, and how its enforcement could occur without 
violating the principle of sovereignty. Specifically, the WHO is not a 
supranational body, and has no authority to violate this principle, although it can 
be argued that the use of unofficial notifications in the IHR is creeping into this 
area. 
Writing after the SARS outbreak, Kickbusch suggested exploring sanctions 
by the UN Security Council, the WTO and the IMF for countries not adhering to 
global health transparency and their obligations under IHR.49 Garrett and Fidler 
also put out the idea of utilizing the UN Security Council, writing that “continued 
failure to break the stalemate may encourage countries threatened by the 
withholding of virus-samples to pursue high-stakes strategies to break the 
deadlock, perhaps by seeking United Nations Security Council intervention on 
the grounds that failure to share.”50 Their point is that if virus-sharing were 
framed as a security issue, it could theoretically be put to the Security Council. 
When Kickbusch suggested Security Council action in response to non-
transparency, she was addressing China’s refusal to allow the WHO to visit the 
Guangdong province, where SARS emerged, or to visit military hospitals where 
SARS patients were hidden.51 However, one of Indonesia’s arguments was that 
the WHO virus-sharing system was not transparent at all. In this sense, could the 
WHO or individual member states be taken to the Security Council because they 
were impeding global heath security through the inequities and lack of 
transparency within the GISN? Regardless, it is unlikely this would be put before 
the Security Council, simply because of the Council’s remit. There have been only 
six Security Council resolutions on health, two of which involved Palestine at the 
time of Israel’s founding and the four since 1997 have dealt with health in conflict 
areas. Additionally, in light of China’s sensitivity towards using infectious disease 
as cause to interfere with state sovereignty, its presence on the Security Council 
makes it highly unlikely that the Council would intervene. 
The other issue called into question was the validity of applying the 
Convention on Biological Diversity to this case, as the Indonesians did. Their 
interpretation was that the Convention gives countries sovereign control over the 
biological resources found within their borders. 52  The other point is that in 
Article 57, the IHR explicitly lays out its relationship to other practices of 
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international law, writing that the provisions of the IHR “shall not affect the 
rights and obligations of any State Party deriving from other international 
agreements.” Indonesia used this to support its claims under the CBD. 53  
However, Fidler argues that the CBD was not intended to be applied to 
pathogenic viruses, and this application is contrary to the Convention’s purpose, 
which was to assist states in conserving and maintaining biological diversity.54 
Stevenson and Cooper take the stance that although the CBD does not explicitly 
cover virus-sharing, Indonesia’s use of it is within the spirit of the convention 
because it highlights existing structural inequality, in this case how how vaccines 
are created and who benefits from their production (financially and physically), 
especially at times of global crises.55 Another dispute point is that claims of 
sovereignty over pathological organisms are problematic. For example, if a 
person with seasonal influenza travelled to another country and was exposed to 
H5N1 and the strains mutated to combine a new virus, it is unclear to whom that 
virus belongs. Sovereignty is also particularly difficult with avian influenza, which 





Why an intergovernmental process? 
 
As discussed above, there are clear issues of both applicability and 
enforceability in using international agreements in this case, but there are other 
reasons why the IHR were not invoked and countries chose to use an 
intergovernmental process. Firstly, the use of the IHR was discussed at the WHO 
Secretariat, but as the IHR had just been negotiated and revised, both the 
Secretariat and member states were loathe for their first use to be one of 
punishing another member state. 
Moreover, Indonesia made the world clearly aware of these issues of 
transparency and benefits-sharing. It has been questioned why, if Indonesia had 
the support of a significant number of member states, it was the only one to cease 
sharing virus samples. Firstly, Indonesia was a special case. Although H5N1 was 
clearly not contained to Indonesia, it had the highest number of human cases and 
fatalities and the country was thrust into the center stage; this focus on 
Indonesia, combined with the government and political situation at the time 
contributed to Indonesia’s decision, as did the revelation that a pharmaceutical 
company was using its samples without its knowledge. In terms of the other 
member states, in spite of the equity and transparency issues, it was in the best 
interest of the other member states to share their virus-samples. Because 
Indonesia had brought the issue to the agenda, there was not a need for other 
member states to actually pull out. However, this paper suggests that not 
invoking the IHR was also a way of showing solidarity for Indonesia.  
Finally, the key failing in Indonesia’s case is one of trust. As Sedyaningsih 
and colleagues point out, some of the virus-sharing practices of the WHO actually 
violated its own guidelines. These have since been changed in light of the current 
situation, but at the time they were released in 2005 they stated: 
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The designated WHO Reference Laboratories will seek permission 
from the originating country/laboratory to co-author and/or 
publish results obtained from the analyses of relevant 
viruses/samples,” and “There will be no further distribution of 
viruses/specimens outside the network of the WHO Reference 
Laboratories without the permission from the originating 
country/laboratory.”56
 
In addition to discovering an Australian pharmaceutical company was to 
produce a vaccine based on its virus, throughout 2006, results from laboratory 
analyses on Indonesian strains were presented at international meetings without 
the prior consent or notification to the Indonesian government or scientists. At 
very late stages of the writing process, Indonesian scientists and governmental 
officials were offered to be included as co-authors in papers written by 
international scientists based on Indonesian strains obtained via the WHO 
system.57 At the time, there was no explanation of the role and functions of 
WHO-affiliated laboratories or exactly why the “Reference laboratories” were 
expanded beyond the four WHO Collaborating Centers and the four WHO H5 
Reference Laboratories.58  
Some recognition was received by the statement from the 1st IGM in 
November which acknowledged the breakdown of trust in the system, but this 
begs another question of enforceability: how can the WHO promote and enforce 
equity, and does its reassurance have weight? Arguably, trust is the WHO’s 
greatest asset. It is an institution with a long history and has had many successes, 
having eradicated smallpox and effectively handled SARS. Even where it has been 
less successful, such as realizing the goals of the Alma-Ata declaration and 
malaria eradication, its intentions have always been good. Yet, in this situation it 
did not act transparently, or in the best interests of poorer nations. This trust can 
certainly be rebuilt over time, but it will take a significant effort and changes, 




The next question to ask is why the negotiations have not been resolved 
after three years, and what are possible solutions? According to an Indonesian 
official, “the most important reform in the WHO level is the reform of the virus 
sharing and benefit sharing mechanism in such a way that make it a fair, 
transparent, and equitable mechanism.” This section examines some of the 
specific outstanding issues and possible solutions, and in the following section 
more general options for improving the environment for global health diplomacy 
based on this case will be examined. 
The first issue regards transparency on data-sharing and standard 
material transfer agreements (SMTA). Although GISN has operated for decades 
with few problems, the situation has changed since the 1950s, and there is an 
increasing demand and need for documents, agreements, and the tracking of 
biological samples, in part because of this breakdown of trust. Although the 
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intergovernmental working group has been creating mechanisms for increased 
transparency, there needs to be continued communication amongst the WHO 
Secretariat and member states, and this trust needs to be rebuilt over time. 
Conversely, on the other side of the argument are countries, such as the United 
States, which oppose the SMTAs. This is an interesting point, as the US is in 
favour of SMTAs with regards to issues of bioterrorism, which suggests that there 
may be other reasons behind their reluctance for SMTAs. 
A second point is reform of international law. Although it has already been 
demonstrated above, current law is inapplicable to the situation, there is scope 
for change. It was decided by the 61st WHA that the revised IHR should be 
reviewed within five years of their implementation, and they are currently under 
review in relation to H1N1 and other public health events. The preliminary 
findings of the review are to be presented to the 63rd WHA in May 2010, with a 
final report in May 2011.59 Because the IHR was only recently revised and that 
revision was a 12 year process, member states are unlikely to call to negotiate a 
further revision. However, issues of equity and virus-sharing may be discussed in 
this review and the IHR can be amended at the will of the member states. 
Another issue with the IHR is the lack of a strong dispute mechanism. Article 56 
suggests that if two member states cannot solve a dispute on their own, they can 
put it to the Director-General of the WHO. In the event of a dispute between 
WHO and one or more state parties concerning the interpretation or application 
of these Regulations, the matter is to be submitted to the World Health Assembly. 
Again, this section could be clarified and in the final section of this paper, other 
options regarding the development of a dispute mechanism for issues both inside 
of and outside of international law will be examined. 
There have also been moves by some countries to add pathological entities 
to the CBD. However, this could be damaging, as are bilateral processes. That is, 
viruses ignore state borders and samples do not typically differ radically amongst 
neighbors. If the CBD were to cover viruses, neighboring countries could 
theoretically get into a bidding war with pharmaceutical companies over their 
samples. Ultimately, this is in no one’s interest. Rather, sharing samples and 
ensuring access to benefits is in everyone’s interest. Moreover, the issue of 
establishing sovereignty over a pathogen – whose virus is it? - remains. Within 
the CBD framework there are also negotiations for an International Regime on 
Access and Benefits sharing, which would also further the promotion of benefits 
sharing and access as laid out in Articles 15 and 8 of the Convention. Again, 
depending on how the Convention is interpreted in the future, this Regime could 
have an impact on health. 
 Instead, the focus should be on benefit-sharing. Public health crises lead to 
change and, as Fidler points out, WHA60.28 does not itself produce equitable 
virus-sharing, but establishes a WHO-based process for moving global health 
diplomacy in this area and is a “general blueprint” for building new global 
governance mechanism, particularly with regard to equitable virus-sharing.60 As 
laid out by the IGM, sharing viruses contributes to increased global health 
security through appropriate risk assessment and response. Benefits also include 
the “access to and transfer of technology for influenza vaccine development and 
production, strengthened national capacity related to influenza preparedness and 
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response, improved risk management through establishment of stockpiles and/or 
provision of: pharmaceuticals, personal protective equipment and other supplies 
necessary during the response to an outbreak; non-commercial diagnostic tests 
and materials; influenza vaccines and ancillary supplies.” Although it is not 
collectively useful for individual states to “sell” their vaccines to pharmaceutical 
companies, it would be collectively useful for the WHO to negotiate on their 
behalf. The practice of the WHO providing biological samples to pharmaceutical 
companies freely to pharmaceutical companies has occurred for decades. The 
Indonesians brought this to the forefront by pointing out the inequities of this. It 
is not suggested that the WHO start selling biological samples, only that the 
WHO serve a “global health diplomacy” role in negotiating benefits. For example, 
in the IGM the point was put forward that the recipient of materials (i.e. a vaccine 
producer) should agree in writing to contribute to the Global Influenza Vaccine 
Fund (GIVF).  
Other venues to which we can turn for guidance include activities on 
intellectual property right and genetic resources by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization’s intergovernmental committee who work closely with 
UNEP and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The FAO has also 
produced the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture contains provisions for material-transfer agreements, benefits 
sharing and other concerns brought up by Indonesia. A full discussion of IP 
rights is outside the scope of this paper, but ensuring a balance between 
commercial interests and benefits-sharing must be addressed if situations such as 
this are to be resolved. 
Another benefit is empowerment though strengthening capacity. The 2005 
IHR revisions also gave countries five years in which to fulfil obligations in terms 
of implementing WHO recommended measure, and developing capacity for the 
detection, reporting, assessment of, and response to PHEICs. However, as 
Kamradt-Scott notes, lower and middle-income countries face challenges in 
implementing these reforms and other measures that higher income countries 
are able to enact.61 Enabling countries to develop not only the surveillance and 
response capacities as laid out in the IHR, but also to create and manufacture 
pharmaceuticals promotes global health security. Moreover, if lower and middle-
income countries were to be empowered in this way, and if the WHO were to 
follow-through on its promises with regards to increasing vaccine production and 
increasing other capacities, then lower and middle-income countries may be 
more likely to concede or compromise within the negotiations. 
Finally, the overarching problem is that the global vaccine production 
capacity is woefully inadequate and production capacity is concentrated in higher 
income countries. Current global capacity for season influenza vaccine 
production is estimated at only 500-900 million doses, although in a pandemic 
situation up to three times as much could be produced, using monovalent, rather 
than trivalent vaccines.62 However, even in a pandemic situation, we still take 
into the account the need to continue producing seasonal influenza vaccines. 
WHO has taken steps to increase capacity – for example, in 2007 they awarded a 
total of $18 million to Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam to 
develop their vaccine manufacturing capability.63 In 2008 the Organization also 
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announced plans to stockpile H5N1 vaccines and out of the virus-sharing 
situation have come efforts to create a policy framework for vaccine allocation 
and use.64 However this situation clearly needs to be fully addressed. 
 
PROMOTING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY THROUGH REFORM 
 
Again, the case of Indonesia can be used to ask broader questions about what 
“effective” global health diplomacy is, how should and could global health 
governance architecture change – and what should the WHO’s role in promoting 
global health security be. In the wake of SARS, Ilona Kickbusch wrote that the 
outbreak presented a “wake-up call for a strong global health policy,” and the 
virus-sharing situation does as well. Again with SARS, one of the main issues was 
China’s unwillingness to cooperate, and although the global health world has not 
been completely reformed in light of SARS, from it the IHR was significantly 
revised to take into account the need to accept reporting from unofficial sources. 
Yet, global health security will be created only if the issues of equity, benefit-
sharing and transparency are addressed, and the wider question now is what 
modes of governance can promote global health security and address future 
global health crises.  
 
WHO level reform 
 
In her address to the 55th World Health Assembly in 2002, Dr. Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, then Director-General, stated:  
 
in a world filled with complex health problems, WHO cannot solve 
them alone. Governments cannot solve them alone. 
Nongovernmental organizations, the private sector and 
Foundations cannot solve them alone. Only through new 
partnerships can we make a difference… Whether we like it or not, 
we are depending on the partners, the resources and the energy 
necessary for at least a 30-fold scale up in effort – to bridge the gap 
and achieve health for all…I should add that in every joint venture 
we seek to define what each partner can bring to the relationship. 
We identify where potential conflicts of interest may limit certain 
types of interaction. We aim to play to each others’ comparative 
advantages…. 
 
The point here is for the WHO to redefine its role and competencies and to 
create various types of partnership where applicable. Lee writes of the on-going 
tension within the WHO between a focus on disease and health, and a focus on 
the broader determinants of health. Traditionally the WHO has focused on the 
former but increasingly, as we recognize the impact of social, trade, economic, 
and foreign policies on health the WHO has moved towards the latter. 65  
However, no one body could feasibly be competent in all of these areas. 
Additionally, with regular budget of $1 billion66 the WHO is limited in what it can 
do, even within health.67  Although this initially seems a large amount, one must 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME III, NO. 2 (SPRING 2010) http://www.ghgj.org
 
IRWIN, INDONESIA, H5N1, AND GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY                                                                     17 
 
 
remember this is the same amount of money donated to health causes by the Bill 
and Melinda Gates foundation each year, a considerable amount of which is 
channelled through the WHO as extra-budgetary funds. The WHO is mandated 
to be the coordinating authority on all international health work. In considering 
reform, the WHO must think about how to ensure that it is coordinating 
effectively, and who can do which tasks most effectively. The WHO should also 
increase its role in global health diplomacy, for example, negotiating with 
pharmaceutical companies when it transfers virus-samples.  
Finally, it is outside the remit of this paper to discuss all types of 
partnership, but one sector to examine is the role of civil society and non-profit 
organizations. For example, in the IHR revisions “unofficial sources” may now 
inform the WHO of PHEIC. In the virus-sharing situation, one can also look at 
the role of GISAID. Although the WHO Secretariat was hesitant toward it, in the 
2009 draft framework for virus-sharing, member states expressed their desire for 
the WHO laboratories to submit their genetic sequences to publicly accessible 
databases, and recognized GISAID in their final report of the World Health 
Assembly. 
 
Governance outside the WHO 
 
Returning to the lack of a dispute mechanism, in which part of the issue is 
a loss of trust in the WHO Secretariat, and the other aspect is that negotiations 
have not been resolved after three years, one must ask how the WHO fits into 
wider global governance mechanisms, and what other bodies could and should be 
involved. The WHO is both an entity and a forum for member states. Simply put, 
the WHOs Secretariat carries out the work as directed by the member states, 
mainly through World Health Assembly resolutions. In the virus-sharing 
example, trust within the WHO Secretariat was broken and Indonesia took issue 
with both the Secretariat and with individual member states, particularly those 
opposing SMTAs, notably the United States. If two countries are in a trade 
dispute, they can bring it to the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, in 
this case, there is no WTO-esque dispute mechanism, the WHO is not designed to 
be a “WTO for health,” and part of the dispute is with the actions of the WHO 
Secretariat itself. A further point is that even if a decision were reached at the 
WHO level, it would be unenforceable which creates a disincentive for reaching a 
mutual agreement. 
In more general terms, this is similar to what would happen if two UN 
bodies were in a dispute that could not be resolved by their respective Director-
Generals or individuals within their secretariats. As discussed above, after SARS 
Kickbusch suggested exploring the possibility of UN Security Council sanctions 
against member states not adhering to IHR obligations.68 Garrett and Fidler also 
ask “what if,” if states were to put this before the Security Council. Although the 
virus-sharing issue can be framed as a “security issue,” it is very unlikely to be 
dealt with by the Security Council and most global health issues are simply not 
within its present remit.  
Taking this debate outside the context of the UN system, the G8, G20 and 
regional groups may fill some of the gaps within global health governance. Health 
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has featured significantly on the G8 agenda, though their financing of new health 
initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. 
Additionally, while the G8 itself has not been directly involved in virus-sharing 
negotiations, G8 representatives have been present at the Inter-governmental 
meetings on virus-sharing.  
However, the G20 is a far more inclusive entity (and includes Indonesia 
and other countries that are directly affected by equitable access to medicines). In 
her blog, Oxford’s Devi Sridhar asks if the G20 is simply a short-term crisis 
arrangement focussed narrowly on economic issues, or if it could be relevant to 
other issues areas, such as health, and specifically asks what role they could play 
in virus-sharing. If the G20 were to widen its discussion beyond economic issues, 
it could serve as a forum for addressing health issues.69 As Sridhar points out, the 
advantage of cross-cutting groupings – such as the G8 or what the G20could be, 
is that they have the potential to facilitate coordination amongst sectors, such as 
health, finance, trade and agriculture – all of which impact upon health. Sridhar 
also hastens to add that we must not neglect the important role that regional 
groups, such as Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) or Community of 
Portuguese Speaking National (CPLP) have had in health, and she further cites 
the role that ACMEC (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) 
have had in the virus-sharing negotiations.70 Conversely, health professionals 
need to understand how health fits into the wider international relations and 
political context. For example, although this paper focuses on virus-sharing, at 
the same time there are overall issues with “Western” countries exploiting poor 
countries for resources such as mineral, oil and gas. In Indonesia specifically, 
there have been deadly protests at the Freeport mine in Papua province, owned 
by the US company Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. 
As evidenced in the SARS case, which contributed to the reform of the 
IHR, crises can lead to change. Questions of improving global health governance 
are not new, but at the moment there are more questions than answers. This 
paper certainly cannot be so arrogant as to suggest reforms; it can only agree with 
Nick Drager and others in that the most sensible course is for WHO member 
states call for the next WHO Commission to create recommendations of how 
global health governance architecture could, and should be redesigned. In 
addition, member states could call for this commission to consider the role the 
WHO Secretariat should play in reform, and what methods and modes of 
collaboration and cooperation should exist amongst it, civil society, the private 
sector, other UN agencies, and regional and global institutions, such as the G8 
and G20, the WTO, and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
Within this framework, proposals for Committee C of the World Health Assembly 
should also be considered and debated.  Committee C could be a first step in 
creating a mechanism for coordinating global health efforts amongst these 
various actors, and through it the WHO could serve as a coordination body for 
global health programs and formally link member states and non-governmental 
health actors. 71  In this sense, we can think of the health sector as a large 
corporation in need of restructuring. The questions of who has competency in 
what areas, who should do what, who should outsource various functions to 
whom and who should coordinate – and where can these individual “divisions” – 
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i.e. institutions - turn for assistance and under which circumstances must be 
asked. Finally, although this is certainly a post-Westphalian world, what aspects 
of sovereignty individual countries are willing to give up within this global health 




The WHO is moving away from a body to offer only technical assistance, and 
toward a focus on the broader determinants of health. A secondary role of the 
WHO is to ensure that health stays on the wider foreign policy agenda. As the 
virus-sharing negotiations have continued for three years without resolution, 
some of the urgency and political will has been lost. This is not to say it is off the 
health agenda, only that is less of a priority in wider political agendas. Effective 
global health diplomacy includes not only negotiation and dispute resolution, but 
also linking health to other sectors. Within current and future global health 
negotiations it is important that the lessons of equity, transparency and access 
illuminated by the virus-sharing case not be forgotten, and to take away lessons 
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